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Escaping from Release: Is Supervised 
Release Custodial under 18 USC § 751(a)? 
Mica Moore† 
INTRODUCTION 
Supervised release is a relatively new form of postincarcera-
tion monitoring. After a defendant has completed a prison term, 
the sentencing court may provide for his release, contingent on 
the defendant’s continued adherence to a series of conditions over 
a set period of time.1 These conditions vary widely. They may in-
clude simple conditions, such as reporting requirements, or more 
complex conditions, such as a requirement that the defendant 
“make reasonable efforts to obtain a GED or high school diploma” 
while on release.2 Congress created supervised release to replace 
federal parole, intending release to serve “rehabilitative ends, dis-
tinct from those served by incarceration,”3 without perpetuating 
the sentencing disparities experienced under the parole system.4 
In 2010, a US Sentencing Commission report noted that almost 
one million individuals had received sentences that included a 
term of supervised release.5 
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 1 See 18 USC § 3624(e): 
The term of supervised release commences on the day the person is released 
from imprisonment. . . . A term of supervised release does not run during any 
period in which the person is imprisoned in connection with a conviction for a 
Federal, State, or local crime unless the imprisonment is for a period of less than 
30 consecutive days. 
Additionally, “a probation officer [ ] shall, during the term imposed, supervise the person 
released to the degree warranted by the conditions specified by the sentencing court.” 18 
USC § 3624(e). 
 2 United States v McKissic, 428 F3d 719, 721, 724 (7th Cir 2005). 
 3 United States v Johnson, 529 US 53, 59 (2000). 
 4 See S Rep No 98-225, 98th Cong, 1st Sess 39–41 (1983), reprinted in 1984 
USCCAN 3182, 3222–24 (“Comprehensive Crime Control Act Report”). 
 5 Federal Offenders Sentenced to Supervised Release *3 (United States Sentencing 
Commission, July 2010), archived at http://perma.cc/9Y25-PEST. 
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It is quite common for releasees to miss scheduled meetings, 
disobey curfews, or otherwise violate their release conditions.6 
When this happens, sentencing judges may redress defendants’ 
violations with a variety of sanctions. Judges may even revoke 
release and sentence the offender to a prison sentence lasting for 
the duration of the original release term.7 In addition, some re-
leasees have also been charged with the independent crime of es-
cape.8 Because escape is a felony punishable by up to five years in 
prison,9 plus up to three years of supervised release,10 an inde-
pendent conviction for escape may significantly lengthen a de-
fendant’s time under criminal-justice supervision. 
It is unclear, however, whether and in what circumstances 
violating release conditions constitutes an “escape” under the fed-
eral statute. Unlike certain state statutes, which narrowly pro-
scribe escape from correctional institutions or from the custody of 
specific state officers,11 the federal escape statute, 18 USC 
§ 751(a), broadly prohibits escape from “any custody under or by 
virtue of any process issued under the laws of the United States.”12 
The escape statute does not define “custody,” and no Supreme 
Court case has provided direct guidance. Because supervised re-
lease may take many different forms, ranging from physical con-
finement to minimal reporting requirements, it is unclear when, 
if ever, defendants on release are in federal custody under 
§ 751(a) and are thus capable of committing escape. 
 
 6 Id at *63. A study conducted by the United States Sentencing Commission found 
that “technical violations accounted for the majority (51.6 percent) of all [supervised re-
lease] violations from 2005 to 2008.” The study defined technical violations as “includ[ing] 
lesser infractions” such as failing to report to a supervising officer and nonpayment of 
fines. Id at *67–68. 
 7 See 18 USC § 3583(e)(3). 
 8 See Federal Offenders at *21 n 108, 68 (cited in note 5). 
 9 18 USC §§ 751(a), 3559(a)(4). 
 10 See 18 USC §§ 3559(a)(4), 3583(b)(2). 
 11 See, for example, Mass Ann Laws ch 268, § 16 (criminalizing escapes from “any 
jail or correctional institution,” “any courthouse,” “the custody of any officer [ ] while being 
conveyed to or from said institution,” and other forms of custody). In other instances, the 
scope of “custody” for escape purposes is defined through a narrowing judicial construction. 
See, for example, White v Commonwealth, 591 SE2d 662, 667 (Va 2004) (“[I]t is clear that 
for purposes of prohibiting an escape under Code § 18.2–479, the General Assembly must 
have intended that the term ‘custody’ would include a degree of physical control or re-
straint under circumstances other than those also necessary to constitute an actual custo-
dial arrest.”); Davis v Commonwealth, 608 SE2d 482, 484 (Va App 2005) (applying the 
definition articulated in White and concluding that a defendant released on bond was not 
in custody within the meaning of the escape statute). 
 12 18 USC § 751(a). 
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The federal courts of appeals have traced the contours of this 
issue in a series of cases involving defendants required to reside 
in halfway houses as a condition of supervised release. The de-
fendants leave the facility and are charged with escape. Circuits 
disagree as to whether such halfway house stays are custodial un-
der § 751(a). In deciding these cases, many circuits define custody 
using expansive legal rules that are not tethered to the presence 
of physical or institutional restraints. These broad constructions 
of custody may have serious implications for other location-based 
forms of supervised release—for example, conditions requiring 
defendants to wear GPS devices, to adhere to curfews, or to re-
main within a judicial district unless granted permission to leave 
by their supervising officer.13 One important concern is that this 
expansive understanding of escape will increase the length and pu-
nitiveness of prison sentences, turning supervised release from a 
tool to facilitate reentry into a powerful new driver of incarceration. 
This Comment begins in Part I by discussing salient aspects 
of the Sentencing Reform Act of 198414 (SRA) and Congress’s re-
placement of parole with supervised release. Part II.A explores 
the circuit split over whether defendants who are ordered to re-
side in halfway houses pursuant to supervised release conditions 
are in custody for purposes of § 751(a); Part II.B discusses key 
weaknesses inherent in the circuits’ approaches. Finally, Part III 
draws on the history of the federal escape statute as well as the 
structure and function of supervised release to propose a rule that 
supervised release violations are categorically noncustodial under 
§ 751(a). 
I.  THE SENTENCING REFORM ACT 
Before exploring the special challenges that supervised re-
lease poses to the application of § 751(a), it is necessary first to 
provide some background on why Congress created supervised re-
lease in the first place. This Part places supervised release in its 
appropriate context as one part of a wider sentencing reform 
scheme. It also outlines some of the specific issues that supervised 
release was intended to resolve. 
 
 13 The Sentencing Guidelines recommend that judges impose this last restriction as 
a standard condition of supervised release. United States Sentencing Commission, Guide-
lines Manual § 5D1.3(c)(1) (Nov 1, 2015) (“USSG”). 
 14 Pub L No 98-473, 98 Stat 1987, codified as amended at 18 USC § 3551 et seq and 
28 USC § 991 et seq. 
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A. The Creation of Supervised Release 
Congress passed the SRA in 1984 to enact widespread re-
forms to the criminal-justice system. Before the SRA, federal sen-
tencing consisted of an indeterminate system in which power was 
principally divided among three authorities.15 First, Congress 
possessed broad authority to set sentencing ranges for specific 
federal crimes, typically in the form of maximum sentences.16 Sec-
ond, sentencing judges had broad discretion to choose a sentence 
within the statutory range, based on their individualized assess-
ments of the facts of the crime and the defendant’s personal char-
acteristics.17 Third, the United States Parole Commission con-
trolled sentences from the back end by selecting eligible prisoners 
for release, conditioned on their continued fulfillment of certain 
requirements.18 Theoretically, the discretion vested in parole au-
thorities to replace incarceration with conditional release acted 
as an administrative check on the discretion of sentencing judges 
to impose prison sentences.19 
This indeterminate sentencing regime fell into disrepute 
throughout the 1960s and 1970s.20 Commentators criticized the 
system for producing disparate sentences between similar defend-
ants.21 Importantly, desire for sentencing reform was driven by dis-
satisfaction with the perceived arbitrariness of both sentencing 
 
 15 See Alan M. Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy Fit the 
Harm, 123 U Pa L Rev 297, 298–301 (1974) (defining indeterminate sentencing as a pro-
cess in which actual time to be served is determined by both a judge and an administrative 
board against the background of a statutory mandate). 
 16 See Kate Stith and Steve Y. Koh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legisla-
tive History of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 28 Wake Forest L Rev 223, 225 & n 7 (1993). 
 17 William W. Berry III, Discretion without Guidance: The Need to Give Meaning to 
§ 3553 after Booker and Its Progeny, 40 Conn L Rev 631, 635–36 (2008). 
 18 Parole Commission and Reorganization Act § 2, Pub L No 94-233, 90 Stat 219, 219 
(1976), codified at 18 USC § 4201 et seq, repealed by the Comprehensive Crime Control 
Act of 1984 § 218, Pub L No 98-273, 98 Stat 1976, 2027. 
 19 See, for example, United States v Addonizio, 442 US 178, 187–90 (1979) (discuss-
ing the relationship between sentencing judges and the Parole Commission). 
 20 See, for example, Sanford H. Kadish, Legal Norm and Discretion in the Police and 
Sentencing Processes, 75 Harv L Rev 904, 915–29 (1962). See also generally, for example, 
Stanley A. Weigel, Appellate Revision of Sentences: To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime, 
20 Stan L Rev 405 (1968); Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law without Order 
(Hill & Wang 1973). 
 21 See, for example, Weigel, 20 Stan L Rev at 406–10 (cited in note 20). But see Kate 
Stith and José A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines in the Federal Courts 
106–12 (Chicago 1998) (questioning the accuracy of pre-SRA studies demonstrating sen-
tencing disparities). 
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judges and the Parole Commission.22 Theoretically, parole pro-
moted rehabilitation by allowing authorities to release prisoners 
who made sufficient progress while incarcerated, thus incentiviz-
ing prisoners to participate in vocational and educational pro-
grams.23 By the 1980s, Congress believed that this model was a 
failure.24 Parole merely perpetuated sentencing disparities by 
conditioning release upon rehabilitation—an amorphous con-
cept.25 The Parole Commission applied agency guidelines inconsist-
ently, and it appeared to be unable to rationally determine when of-
fenders were rehabilitated and therefore suited for release.26 
In addition, rather than acting as a check on sentencing dis-
cretion, the availability of parole gave district court judges per-
verse incentives. To retain control over sentencing, judges would 
occasionally oversentence defendants, such that the earliest pa-
role date would coincide with the sentence length the judge be-
lieved the defendant deserved.27 For example, a judge who believed 
that a defendant deserved five years in prison could exert some 
level of control over his release date by sentencing the defendant 
to a fifteen-year term without early parole eligibility. Without 
early release, the prisoner would become parole eligible by statute 
after serving one-third of his sentence.28 But this introduced a 
 
 22 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act Report at 38–41 (cited in note 4) (criticizing 
the “unfettered discretion the law confers on those judges and parole authorities respon-
sible for imposing and implementing the sentence”); William W. Wilkins Jr, Phyllis J. 
Newton, and John R. Steer, Competing Sentencing Policies in a “War on Drugs” Era, 28 
Wake Forest L Rev 305, 308–10 (1993). 
 23 Comprehensive Crime Control Act Report at 40 (cited in note 4). 
 24 Id. 
 25 See id (“We know too little about human behavior to be able to rehabilitate indi-
viduals on a routine basis or even to determine accurately whether or when a particular 
prisoner has been rehabilitated.”). 
 26 See id at 38, 48. See also Jonathan D. Casper, Determinate Sentencing and Prison 
Crowding in Illinois, 1984 U Ill L Rev 231, 236 (noting that “[c]onservatives and law en-
forcement interests” supported determinate sentencing because “parole boards seemed of-
ten to release prisoners who continued to pose a danger to society,” and judges seemed 
“reluctant to send ‘marginal defendants’ to prison”); William J. Genego, Peter D. Goldberger, 
and Vicki C. Jackson, Project, Parole Release Decisionmaking and the Sentencing Process, 
84 Yale L J 810, 826 & n 82 (1975) (“Extensive social science research strongly suggests 
that rehabilitation—defined as an increasing likelihood of successful adjustment upon re-
lease—cannot be observed, detected or measured.”).  
 27 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act Report at 112–13 (cited in note 4). See also 
Stefan R. Underhill, Did the Man I Sentenced to 18 Years Deserve It? (NY Times, Jan 23, 
2016), online at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/opinion/sunday/did-i-sentence-a 
-murderer-or-a-cooperative-witness.html (visited Jan 31, 2016) (Perma archive unavailable) 
(offering a description of this phenomenon by a federal district judge). 
 28 See 18 USC § 4205(a), repealed by the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 
§ 218(a)(5), 98 Stat at 2027. 
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level of uncertainty to the system, as the defendant would receive 
the judge’s intended sentence only if the Parole Commission’s as-
sessment of the prisoner, as well as the prisoner’s conduct while in-
carcerated, perfectly aligned with the sentencing judge’s prediction. 
Congress passed the SRA to shift sentencing to a more rule-
like and uniform regime, thus reducing perceived sentencing dis-
parities and promoting transparency in sentencing.29 Although the 
Sentencing Guidelines are the most studied manifestation of this 
new sentencing philosophy,30 the abolition of federal parole was 
also a critical element of this shift. The SRA prospectively abol-
ished parole for federal prisoners sentenced for offenses commit-
ted on or after November 1, 1987.31 Only federal prisoners sen-
tenced prior to this date remain eligible for parole.  
Congress, however, did not entirely abandon the goal of 
postincarceration supervision. In fact, Congress observed an 
anomaly in the parole system: assuming that parole truly facili-
tated reentry, those most in need of monitoring would not receive 
it.32 Specifically, better-behaved inmates would be granted parole, 
receiving supervision in lieu of their remaining prison time, even 
if they did not actually need assistance.33 Conversely, inmates 
who behaved poorly would not be paroled. These inmates would 
serve longer prison terms but would not receive any postincarcer-
ation monitoring.34 
Congress created supervised release to ameliorate these 
problems. Supervised release would “ease the defendant’s transi-
tion into the community after the service of a long prison term” 
and “provide rehabilitation to a defendant who has spent a fairly 
short period in prison . . . but still needs supervision and training 
 
 29 Comprehensive Crime Control Act Report at 65 (cited in note 4): 
The shameful disparity in criminal sentences is a major flaw in the existing 
criminal justice system. . . . 
 . . . The bill’s sweeping provisions are designed to structure judicial sentenc-
ing discretion, eliminate indeterminate sentencing, phase out parole release, 
and make criminal sentencing fairer and more certain. 
 30 See generally, for example, Paul J. Hofer and Mark H. Allenbaugh, The Reason 
behind the Rules: Finding and Using the Philosophy of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 
40 Am Crim L Rev 19 (2003); Charles J. Ogletree Jr, The Death of Discretion? Reflections 
on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 Harv L Rev 1938 (1988). 
 31 See Sentencing Reform Act §§ 218(a), 235(a)(1), 98 Stat at 2031, as amended by 
Sentencing Reform Amendments Act of 1985 § 4, Pub L No 99-217, 99 Stat 1728, 1728. 
 32 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act Report at 122–23 (cited in note 4). 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
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programs after release.”35 Unlike parole, supervised release 
would be entirely independent of the preceding prison term, help-
ing defendants acclimate to life outside of prison without simul-
taneously facilitating arbitrariness in sentencing.36 
B. The Structure of Supervised Release 
Supervised release is a form of postconfinement monitoring. 
After a defendant is sentenced to a prison term, the sentencing 
court may, and under certain circumstances must,37 require a 
term of supervised release that begins after the prison term is 
completed.38 Similar to probationers, individuals on supervised 
release are monitored by the US Probation Office.39 Releasees and 
probationers are subject to similar conditions.40 
Supervised release differs structurally from other conditional 
release systems, such as parole (which is still common at the state 
level) and probation. Most importantly, supervised release is not 
an alternative to incarceration, but a separate and additional pe-
riod of monitoring concerned with facilitating the reintegration of 
the defendant into the community. By contrast, a parolee agrees 
to abide by a set of conditions in exchange for release from prison. 
And similarly, a judge may sentence a defendant to either a pro-
bation term or a prison term, but not both.41 Supervised release 
must follow imprisonment; it cannot be imposed on its own.42 
These differences reflect the rehabilitative character of release by 
fully disaggregating the punitive and transitional phases of a de-
fendant’s sentence.43 
 
 35 Id at 124. 
 36 However, for an argument that supervised release restored indeterminate sen-
tencing, see generally Fiona Doherty, Indeterminate Sentencing Returns: The Invention of 
Supervised Release, 88 NYU L Rev 958 (2013). 
 37 Supervised release is occasionally statutorily mandated. See, for example, 21 USC 
§ 841(b) (setting out mandatory release terms for certain drug offenses). 
 38 18 USC § 3583(a). 
 39 18 USC § 3601. 
 40 See 18 USC § 3563(b) (listing permissible probation conditions); 18 USC § 3583(d) 
(incorporating § 3563(b) in listing valid supervised release conditions). 
 41 18 USC § 3561(a)(3). 
 42 18 USC § 3583(a) (authorizing courts to include a term of supervised release to 
commence “after imprisonment”). See also Doherty, 88 NYU L Rev at 998 (cited in note 36) 
(noting that supervised release is “a discretionary supplement to prison, not a sentence in 
its own right”); United States v Johnson, 529 US 53, 59 (2000) (“The objectives of super-
vised release would be unfulfilled if excess prison time were to offset and reduce terms of 
supervised release.”). 
 43 See Johnson, 529 US at 59 (“Supervised release fulfills rehabilitative ends, distinct 
from those served by incarceration.”). 
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This distinction also has important legal consequences. For 
example, circuits uniformly hold that supervised release terms 
may extend a defendant’s total time under criminal-justice super-
vision beyond the statutory maximum number of years permitted 
for imprisonment. Because release terms are independent moni-
toring periods rather than elements of the direct sentence, they 
are not subject to these statutory caps.44 
These structural features may also be understood in part as 
rectifying procedural deficiencies that Congress identified in the 
parole system. Congress previously criticized the then-existing 
sentencing framework for permitting judges to play guessing 
games with parole officials, attempting to calibrate sentences to 
their predictions of when the prisoners would be granted parole.45 
By contrast, district court judges impose supervised release terms 
during the initial sentencing, thus consolidating sentencing au-
thority in the district court judge and limiting the number of in-
dividuals with discretionary control over a defendant’s sentence. 
Further, supervised release is generally restricted to fixed 
terms not to exceed one, three, or five years, depending on the 
severity of the offense.46 Under the parole system, defendants 
were supervised for whatever length of time they had remaining 
on the balance of their sentence. Supervised release was intended 
to create a more transparent system, with each defendant receiv-
ing a fixed term of supervision at the outset of his sentence rather 
than through later administrative hearings.47 
Defendants are required to abide by a set of conditions while 
on release. Some of these conditions are statutorily mandated and 
 
 44 See United States v Work, 409 F3d 484, 489–90 (1st Cir 2005) (collecting cases 
from the Second, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and DC Circuits). 
 45 Comprehensive Crime Control Act Report at 112–13 (cited in note 4). 
 46 18 USC § 3583(b) (setting supervised term limits, except as otherwise provided by 
statute). But see United States v Moriarty, 429 F3d 1012, 1023–25 (11th Cir 2005) (per 
curiam) (holding that a lifetime term of supervised release imposed for a sex offense did 
not violate the Eighth Amendment); United States v Pettus, 303 F3d 480, 487 (2d Cir 2002) 
(“There is no constitutionally imposed limit on how long a supervised release term can 
be.”). Sex offenders have the highest rate of revocation for technical violations—perhaps 
due to the prevalence of lengthy release terms that increase the difficulty of perfect com-
pliance. See Federal Offenders at *68 (cited in note 5). 
 47 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act Report at 123 (cited in note 4) (“Unlike [un-
der] current parole law, the question whether the defendant will be supervised following 
his term of imprisonment is dependent on whether the judge concludes that he needs su-
pervision, rather than on the question whether a particular amount of his term of impris-
onment remains.”). 
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universal for all defendants.48 For example, all individuals on su-
pervised release must refrain from committing further crimes and 
must not unlawfully possess any controlled substances.49 In addi-
tion, district courts have significant discretion to create individu-
alized conditions, so long as they (1) are “reasonably related” to a 
list of sentencing factors; (2) “involve[ ] no greater deprivation of 
liberty than is reasonably necessary”; and (3) are “consistent 
with [ ] pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission.”50 The district court may modify or eliminate release 
conditions throughout the term51 and may terminate the term 
early for good behavior.52 
Several developments have called the nonpunitive nature of 
supervised release into question. First, Congress expanded the 
list of factors that judges must look at when making these deci-
sions. These factors are drawn from the wider list of considerations 
that judges must look at when choosing a prison sentence.53 Orig-
inally, Congress excluded both punishment and incapacitation 
from the list, in line with the distinct aims of release.54 In 1987, 
Congress added incapacitation to the list, directing judges to con-
sider the need “to protect the public from further crimes of the 
defendant” in creating release terms.55 This revision undermines 
the transitional aims of supervised release by permitting judges 
to focus on continued seclusion rather than defendants’ reintro-
duction into the community. Today, judges may consider incapac-
itation not only in choosing the appropriate prison sentence 
length, but also in defining the terms of the defendant’s release. 
 
 48 18 USC § 3583(d) (listing standard release conditions). 
 49 18 USC § 3583(d). 
 50 18 USC § 3583(d). 
 51 18 USC § 3583(e)(2). 
 52 18 USC § 3583(e)(1) (authorizing a sentencing judge to terminate a release term 
after one year if “such action is warranted by the conduct of the defendant released and 
the interest of justice”). 
 53 See 18 USC § 3553(a) (listing factors for consideration such as “the nature and 
circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant”; “the 
need for the sentence imposed . . . to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct . . . 
[and] to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training, medical 
care, or other correctional treatment . . .”; the Sentencing Guidelines; policy statements 
issued by the Sentencing Commission; “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence dispari-
ties”; and “the need to provide restitution to any victims of the offense”). 
 54 See Comprehensive Crime Control Act Report at 125 (cited in note 4) (“The term of 
supervised release . . . may not be imposed for purposes of punishment or incapacitation 
since those purposes will have been served to the extent necessary by the term of 
imprisonment.”). 
 55 Sentencing Act of 1987 § 9, Pub L No 100-182, 101 Stat 1266, 1267, codified at 18 
USC § 3583(e)(1). 
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Second, Congress added specific procedures courts could use 
to revoke release.56 Even without revocation, judges have a great 
deal of flexibility in dealing with violations of supervised release 
conditions. If a defendant violates a term of supervised release, 
the sentencing judge may continue the term without alteration, 
impose additional conditions, or extend the term of supervised re-
lease.57 Initially, Congress did not believe that minor violations of 
release conditions should result in a resentencing of the defend-
ant and thus declined to create a revocation process.58 Congress 
envisioned that district courts would instead use contempt pro-
ceedings to redress repeated or serious violations.59 If the defend-
ant committed a new offense while on release, it was assumed 
that either a prosecution for that offense or a court order for con-
tempt would sufficiently redress the violation.60 For technical vi-
olations, the judge could make release conditions more severe, ra-
ther than returning the defendant to prison.61 
Today, in addition to sustaining, extending, or adding condi-
tions to the original release term, judges may also revoke release 
entirely and sentence the defendant to imprisonment for all or 
part of the originally authorized supervised release term without 
credit for time previously served on release.62 Many commenta-
tors argue that the inclusion of revocation as a penalty reintro-
duced punishment into release’s aims, turning supervised release 
from a rehabilitative measure to a punitive form of conditional 
release more akin to parole.63 Many of these additional features 
appear to fly in the face of Congress’s initial aim of creating a 
system in which “a prisoner has completed his prison term when 
 
 56 See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 § 1006(a)(3)(D), Pub L No 99-570, 100 Stat 3207, 
3207-6 to -7, codified as amended at 18 USC § 3583(e)(3). 
 57 See 18 USC § 3583(e)(2)–(3). 
 58 Comprehensive Crime Control Act Report at 125 (cited in note 4) (“Unlike a term 
of probation, however, the term of supervised release is not subject to revocation for a 
violation. Instead, for the usual violations, the term or condit[i]ons of supervised release 
may be amended pursuant to subsection (e).”). 
 59 Id. 
 60 Id. 
 61 See id at 59 (suggesting that offering sentencing options aside from imprisonment 
may avoid unwarranted restrictions on liberty). 
 62 18 USC § 3583(e)(3). 
 63 See, for example, Doherty, 88 NYU L Rev at 1000–04 (cited in note 36) (“[T]he 
possibility of revocation made supervised release indisputably about punishment, over-
sight, and coercion.”); Christine S. Scott-Hayward, Shadow Sentencing: The Imposition of 
Federal Supervised Release, 18 Berkeley J Crim L 180, 201–04 (2013) (analyzing the effect 
of supervised release on defendants and concluding that release does not advance public 
safety or rehabilitative goals). 
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released even if he is released to serve a term of supervised re-
lease.”64 Instead of fixed prison terms followed by fixed periods of 
monitoring, revocation creates possibilities for further imprison-
ment at indeterminate points in the future. Although revocation 
may serve rehabilitative purposes by removing defendants from 
release who are likely to reoffend, revocation also allows defend-
ants to be reimprisoned for violating conditions that proscribe 
otherwise-legal behaviors. Stated otherwise, revocation permits 
offenders to be imprisoned for failing to progress, eroding the bar-
rier between the rehabilitative and punitive phases of a sentence.65 
Importantly, while supervised release may constitute punish-
ment as a descriptive matter, judges still consider supervised re-
lease to serve predominately rehabilitative goals.66 It is for this 
reason that courts have held that sentencing defendants to life-
time terms of supervised release does not violate the Eighth 
Amendment.67 The Second Circuit has gone a step further, observ-
ing in dicta that “[t]here is no constitutional limit on how long a 
supervised release term can be.”68 These decisions are premised 
on the idea that the stakes are lower for a defendant who is sub-
ject to rehabilitative monitoring, and that supervised release 
should therefore be subject to reduced constitutional scrutiny.69 It 
is important to keep these decisions in mind when examining the 
 
 64 Comprehensive Crime Control Act Report at 58 (cited in note 4). 
 65 See, for example, United States v Nolan, 109 F Supp 2d 350, 351–52 (ED Pa 2000) 
(imposing a revocation penalty of ten months’ imprisonment on a defendant who failed to 
report to five scheduled meetings with his supervising officer and failed to enter a drug-
treatment program, in violation of the terms of his supervised release); United States v 
McCauley, 102 F Supp 2d 271, 271–72 (ED Pa 2000) (revoking release for a defendant who 
tested positive for cocaine and alcohol). 
 66 See, for example, Johnson, 529 US at 60 (“In the instant case, the transition assis-
tance ordered by the trial court required respondent, among other conditions, to avoid 
possessing or transporting firearms and to participate in a drug dependency treatment 
program. These conditions illustrate that supervised release, unlike incarceration, pro-
vides individuals with postconfinement assistance.”); Tapia v United States, 131 S Ct 
2382, 2390 (2011) (“[W]hen Congress wanted sentencing courts to take account of rehabil-
itative needs, it gave courts the authority to direct appropriate treatment for offenders. 
Thus, the SRA instructs courts, in deciding whether to impose probation or supervised 
release, to consider whether an offender could benefit from training and treatment programs.”). 
 67 See Moriarty, 429 F3d at 1023–25 (holding that a lifetime term of supervised re-
lease imposed for a sex offense did not violate the Eighth Amendment, citing the transi-
tional aims of release); United States v Williams, 636 F3d 1229, 1232–34 (9th Cir 2011) (same). 
 68 Pettus, 303 F3d at 487. 
 69 See, for example, Williams, 636 F3d at 1232 (“[A]lthough supervised release limits 
a criminal’s liberty and privacy, it is a punishment far less severe than prison.”); Pettus, 303 
F3d at 486 (noting that while “supervised release is technically a punishment, . . . it is 
primarily intended to protect the public from further crimes by easing the re-entry of a 
convicted defendant into society”). 
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penalties that defendants may permissibly incur for violating the 
terms of their release. If the penalties for condition violations are 
severe, then the stakes are in reality quite high for defendants on 
release, given that they may be subject to lifetime monitoring. 
C. The Uncertain Custodial Status of Supervised Release 
Given the quasi-rehabilitative, quasi-punitive, and occasion-
ally quasi-incapacitative character of supervised release, should 
persons on release be considered to be in federal custody? This 
question is quite important. A defendant’s custodial status may 
determine when his criminal sentence begins,70 how long his sen-
tence lasts,71 whether various sentencing enhancements apply to 
him,72 and whether he may seek habeas relief.73 
Similarly, a defendant’s custodial status determines whether 
he may be charged with escape. 18 USC § 751(a) codifies the 
common-law crime of escape for federal offenders. To convict a 
defendant, prosecutors must prove that the defendant absconded 
from (1) “the custody of the Attorney General or his authorized 
representative”; (2) “any institution or facility in which [the de-
fendant] is confined by direction of the Attorney General”; 
(3) “any custody under or by virtue of any process issued under 
the laws of the United States by any court, judge, or magistrate 
judge”; or (4) the custody of a federal officer pursuant to a lawful 
arrest.74 Defendants on supervised release are prosecuted under 
category three. Strikingly, the statute defines neither “escape” 
nor “custody.” 
Both the structure and the function of supervised release 
make it difficult to determine whether persons on supervised re-
lease are in custody even if one puts these statutory ambiguities 
to one side and proceeds from a commonsense understanding of 
the term. By way of example, it is intuitively easy to accept that 
 
 70 18 USC § 3585(a) (“A sentence to a term of imprisonment commences on the date 
the defendant is received in custody awaiting transportation to, or arrives voluntarily to 
commence service of sentence at, the official detention facility at which the sentence is to 
be served.”). 
 71 18 USC § 3585(b) (listing circumstances in which a defendant may be given credit 
for time served in prior custody). 
 72 See, for example, USSG § 3C1.1 (providing a sentencing enhancement for obstruc-
tion of justice in cases in which the defendant absconded from federal custody). 
 73 See 28 USC § 2241(c) (authorizing habeas petitions for individuals in enumerated 
forms of custody). See also Part II.B. 
 74 18 USC § 751(a). 
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all individuals who are currently incarcerated for committing fed-
eral crimes are in federal custody. These persons are subject to 
physical confinement, experience constraints on their activities, 
and have easily identifiable custodians. The overarching purpose 
of their confinement is punitive, which seems relevant as it sug-
gests that these persons may not leave the boundaries of their 
confinement without facing further sanctions. Most importantly, 
18 USC § 3621 clarifies that persons sentenced to prison terms 
are committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons until the 
expiration of that term.75 
It is difficult to make the same leap for persons on supervised 
release, who are required to abide by a set of conditions but are 
not under the same extreme level of direct control. Furthermore, 
as discussed above, release terms are intended to form a rehabil-
itative phase that is separate and distinct from imprisonment. 
Persons on release have already completed a preceding prison 
term for an offense. The use of the term “release” ordinarily con-
notes some degree of freedom from restraint.76 Finally, there is no 
statutory provision clarifying whether supervised release is 
custodial. 
To further complicate matters, release terms may take a va-
riety of different forms, some of which resemble direct incarcera-
tion more than others. Before discussing how courts have grap-
pled with the question whether release conditions are custodial, 
it is useful to first briefly outline the different forms of release. 
At one end of the spectrum are forms of supervised release 
that replicate physical confinement. It is important to note that 
these conditions have historically been subject to special statu-
tory limitations.77 For example, the SRA restricts judges’ ability 
 
 75 18 USC § 3621(a) (“A person who has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment 
. . . shall be committed to the custody of the Bureau of Prisons until the expiration of the 
term imposed.”). 
 76 See Johnson, 529 US at 57 (“[T]he ordinary, commonsense meaning of release is 
to be freed from confinement. To say respondent was released while still imprisoned di-
minishes the concept the word intends to convey.”). 
 77 A judge may sentence a defendant to home confinement as a condition of super-
vised release, but if this is done, the term of the confinement functions similarly to parole 
in that it is treated as an alternative, rather than as a supplement, to incarceration. That 
is, home confinement as a condition to supervised release acts as “an alternative to incar-
ceration” such that the total amount of time served, in prison and in home confinement, 
cannot exceed the statutory maximum for the crime committed by the defendant. See 
USSG § 5C1.1(c)(2)–(3) (recommending that judges use home confinement to reduce a di-
rect prison sentence); 18 USC § 3583(e)(4) (providing that judges may impose home con-
finement “only as an alternative to incarceration”); United States v Ferguson, 369 F3d 847, 
850 (5th Cir 2004) (per curiam) (holding that “incarceration and home [confinement] are 
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to prescribe intermittent confinement (sentences that allow de-
fendants to remain at liberty but require them to return to the 
custody of the Bureau of Prisons during nights, weekends, or 
other intervals of time).78 Intermittent confinement is not available 
as a general condition of supervised release; a judge may impose 
this sentence only to redress a condition violation.79 
Other forms of release conditions approximate, but do not 
replicate, forms of physical confinement. These quasi-detentive 
conditions often restrict an individual’s freedom of movement or 
association. For example, courts may impose conditions requiring 
the defendants to reside at transitional facilities80 (colloquially 
known as halfway houses), to abide by curfews,81 or to submit to 
GPS monitoring.82 Many standard conditions of release fall into 
this category.83 
Finally, some forms of supervised release do not approximate 
physical confinement at all. For example, district court judges 
have ordered defendants to use contraception,84 to use only their 
“true legal name,”85 or to refrain from driving for the duration of 
the release term.86 Many release conditions target behaviors that 
are specifically related to an individual defendant’s crimes, but 
there is no requirement that release conditions target only illegal 
behaviors. A judge may, for example, impose a condition requiring 
abstinence from alcohol for a defendant who used the proceeds 
 
alternative punishments that may not combine in excess of the maximum statutory term 
of incarceration”). 
 78 18 USC § 3563(b)(10). 
 79 See 18 USC §§ 3563(b)(1), 3583(d). 
 80 See, for example, United States v Griner, 358 F3d 979, 982 (8th Cir 2004) (uphold-
ing a release condition requiring the defendant to reside at a community corrections facility). 
 81 See, for example, United States v Rivera-López, 736 F3d 633, 634, 636–37 (1st Cir 
2013) (upholding conditions requiring the defendant to remain at his residence from 6:00 
p.m. to 6:00 a.m. and to wear an electronic-monitoring device twenty-four hours a day). 
 82 See United States v Porter, 555 F Supp 2d 341, 343, 345 (EDNY 2008). 
 83 See, for example, USSG § 5D1.3(c)(1) (recommending a condition directing the de-
fendant to stay within the judicial district except with permission from the probation of-
ficer). See also United States v Truscello, 168 F3d 61, 63 (2d Cir 1999) (“[T]he so-called 
‘standard conditions’ [of USSG § 5D1.3(c)] . . . are basic administrative requirements. . . . 
[T]hey are almost uniformly imposed by the district courts and have become boilerplate.”) 
(quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
 84 See, for example, United States v Cason, 25 F Supp 3d 1212, 1213 (WD Mo 2014) 
(imposing a supervised release condition requiring the defendant to “use contraceptives 
. . . unless such use would violate his religious scruples or is expressly rejected by his sex-
ual partner”). See also United States v Borski, 2013 WL 4830238, *2–3 (SD Ind) (involving 
a defendant who was forbidden to possess “any pornography, erotica, or nude images” as 
a condition of supervised release). 
 85 United States v Soltero, 510 F3d 858, 865 (9th Cir 2007) (per curiam). 
 86 See, for example, United States v Kingsley, 241 F3d 828, 837–38 (6th Cir 2001). 
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from thefts to finance an alcohol addiction.87 Other conditions are 
designed to increase social productivity; for example, judges may 
require releasees to pay child support or seek mental health 
treatment.88 
These diverse forms of release underscore the difficulty of de-
termining when supervised release is custodial under § 751(a). 
They suggest that supervised release may look very different for 
different defendants. Some states with programs similar to fed-
eral supervised release have dealt with this problem by amending 
their escape statutes to cover such conduct. The Maine escape 
statute, for example, explicitly provides that a person who “inten-
tionally violates a curfew, residence, time or travel restriction” 
may be charged with “escape from supervised community confine-
ment.”89 The federal escape statute, by contrast, has not been 
meaningfully amended since 1948—leaving it to the courts to de-
termine whether and when release terms are custodial under 
§ 751(a). 
II.  THE HALFWAY HOUSE CASES 
A recent series of cases all share the same basic fact pattern: 
a defendant completes a prison term, begins a term of supervised 
release requiring residence at a halfway house, leaves the facility, 
and is charged with escape from federal custody. These halfway 
house cases are the first cases in which circuits have addressed 
whether one can escape from supervised release. 
The halfway house cases are important in that they require 
courts to (1) determine whether a defendant who resides at a 
reentry facility as a condition of supervised release is in custody 
for purposes of § 751(a), and, in the process, (2) articulate a work-
able principle for determining whether other individuals on su-
pervised release should be considered to be in custody. This issue 
is settled in the context of direct imprisonment. Courts uniformly 
hold that incarcerated persons who are transferred90 from a penal 
institution to a halfway house to finish out the remainder of their 
 
 87 See United States v Thurlow, 44 F3d 46, 47 (1st Cir 1995) (per curiam). 
 88 See United States v Barajas, 331 F3d 1141, 1143 (10th Cir 2003). 
 89 17–A Me Rev Stat Ann § 755(1–B). 
 90 See 18 USC § 3624(c)(1) (directing the Bureau of Prisons, “to the extent practicable,” 
to ensure that prisoners spend a portion of their last year of imprisonment “under condi-
tions that will afford that prisoner a reasonable opportunity to adjust to and prepare for 
the reentry of that prisoner into the community”). 
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sentences are in custody.91 But circuits disagree about whether 
the differences between supervised release and traditional incar-
ceration militate in favor of a different rule. 
Part II.A analyzes halfway house cases in the Second, 
Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits and traces the three rules cre-
ated by the courts for determining whether an individual is in 
§ 751(a) custody. Part II.B critiques the circuits’ approaches. 
A. Interpreting § 751(a): The Circuit Split 
The Second, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits hold that a defend-
ant who is released to a halfway house as a condition of super-
vised release is in custody for purposes of the escape statute. 
These courts rely on similarly expansive constructions of “cus-
tody” in reaching this holding. These broad constructions of 
§ 751(a) may have interesting implications for other cases: If a 
defendant removes a GPS device, violates a nighttime curfew, or 
fails to comply with reporting requirements, has he absconded 
from custody within the meaning of § 751(a)? 
In contrast to these circuits, the Ninth Circuit has advanced 
a narrower interpretation of the escape statute. The court sug-
gests that custody is limited to those release conditions approxi-
mating traditional incarceration, but it gestures toward a rule 
that supervised release conditions are categorically noncustodial. 
1. The Second and Eighth Circuits: Custody is established 
by restraints on activities. 
The Second and Eighth Circuits endorse a “restraint on ac-
tivities” rule for determining custody. Under this rule, an individ-
ual is within federal custody when he is subjected to limits on his 
activities. The Second Circuit advanced this rule in United States 
v Edelman.92 Jody Edelman was convicted of a drug offense and 
sentenced to seven years of imprisonment followed by three years 
of supervised release.93 After repeated violations, the sentencing 
 
 91 See, for example, Nace v United States, 334 F2d 235, 235–36 (8th Cir 1964) (per 
curiam) (holding that the defendant, who was allowed to serve his sentence at a halfway 
house, was in custody for purposes of the escape statute notwithstanding the freedom al-
lowed to him at the institution); McCullough v United States, 369 F2d 548, 549–50 (8th 
Cir 1966); Perez–Calo v United States, 757 F Supp 1, 2 (D Puerto Rico 1991). 
 92 726 F3d 305 (2d Cir 2013). 
 93 Id at 307. 
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judge modified Edelman’s release to include residence in a half-
way house for five months.94 Edelman left the halfway house be-
fore the end of his term and committed a series of drug offenses.95 
He was arrested and charged with escape for his departure.96 
Edelman appealed, arguing that his halfway house stay did not 
constitute custody under § 751(a).97 
The Second Circuit disagreed with Edelman’s argument. The 
court observed that “[c]ustody may be minimal, and indeed, may 
be constructive.”98 The court found textual support for this read-
ing, noting that § 751(a) refers broadly to “any custody under or 
by virtue of any process,” supporting an expansive reading.99 The 
court further observed that custody requires only “some restraint 
upon [an individual’s] complete freedom.”100 Conceding that 
Edelman’s residence at the halfway house differed substantially 
from traditional forms of incarceration, the court nonetheless 
noted that the release conditions still “subjected [the defendant] 
to a restraint on his activities and limited the amount of time he 
could spend out of the facility.”101 Residents at Edelman’s halfway 
house were not permitted to leave without notifying staff before-
hand, were required to sign out separately before each activity, 
and could leave the facility for only up to twelve hours at a time.102 
The Second Circuit concluded that these restraints established 
§ 751(a) custody.103 
In United States v Goad,104 the Eighth Circuit, facing similar 
facts, arrived at the same conclusion. According to the court, it 
was sufficient to sustain an escape indictment that “(1) Goad was 
court-ordered to reside for 120 days at the Hinzman Center and 
obey its rules; (2) the Hinzman Center prohibited departures with-
out authorization; and (3) Goad left early without obtaining au-
thorization and failed to return.”105 
 
 94 Id. 
 95 Id at 307–08. 
 96 Edelman, 726 F3d at 308. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id at 309. 
 99 Id at 309–10, quoting 18 USC § 751(a). 
 100 Edelman, 726 F3d at 309–10. 
 101 Id. 
 102 Id at 307. 
 103 Id at 309–10. 
 104 788 F3d 873 (8th Cir 2015). 
 105 Id at 876. 
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The defendant in Goad attempted to contrast the state of be-
ing in the attorney general’s custody with the state of being re-
leased to the supervision of a federal probation officer.106 This ar-
gument is premised on the idea that custody is relational—that 
custody cannot exist in a vacuum, but denotes a specific relation-
ship between a custodian and the object of supervision. A rela-
tional understanding of custody undermines the restraints-on-
activities approach by requiring courts to identify a custodian ra-
ther than simply asking about what types of activities the defendant 
may permissibly engage in. Various provisions of § 751(a) appear 
to identify a particular guardian that is the source of the custodial 
relationship, as they criminalize escape from the custody of the 
attorney general, his authorized representative, and federal offic-
ers conducting lawful arrests.107 These clauses do not identify the 
agency that oversees defendants on probation and supervised re-
lease as a potential custodian, even though probation existed at 
the federal level when the escape statute was initially passed, and 
probation conditions may also include forms of confinement.108 
The omission of the US Probation Office is particularly surpris-
ing given that probation, unlike supervised release, is a crimi-
nal sentence in its own right that is imposed as a substitute for 
imprisonment.109 
The Goad court quickly disposed of the relational argument, 
again pointing to the broad text of the relevant subsection of the 
escape statute.110 The particular clause used to prosecute escapes 
from supervised release refers to “any custody under or by virtue 
of any process issued under the laws of the United States.”111 Be-
cause this subsection does not identify a particular custodian, the 
Goad court reasoned that the defendant’s arguments were irrele-
vant.112 The § 751(a) requirement was met when the district court 
sentenced Goad to serve out his release term at a halfway 
house.113 
 
 106 Id at 875. 
 107 See 18 USC § 751(a). 
 108 See, for example, United States v Dowling, 962 F2d 390, 391 (5th Cir 1992) (in-
volving a defendant ordered to reside at a halfway house as a condition of probation). 
 109 See 18 USC § 3561(a)(3). 
 110 See Goad, 788 F3d at 876. 
 111 18 USC § 751(a) (emphases added). 
 112 See Goad, 788 F3d at 876 (suggesting that the lack of reference to any particular 
custodian in this clause suggests that all custodians must be treated alike). 
 113 Id. 
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2. The Tenth Circuit: Custody is established by the right to 
control an individual. 
The Tenth Circuit, in accord with the Second and Eighth 
Circuits, held in United States v Foster114 that defendants ordered 
to reside in halfway houses pursuant to supervised release condi-
tions are in custody under § 751(a).115 Cheston Foster was sen-
tenced to time served and thirty months of supervised release as 
a revocation penalty for violating the conditions of a previous re-
lease term.116 During the sentencing phase of the trial, Foster’s su-
pervising officer asked the court to add a halfway house condition 
to the defendant’s term of release, in light of the defendant’s un-
stable residence and employment situations.117 Foster left the 
halfway house and was charged with escape.118 The district court 
dismissed the indictment, reasoning that the release condition 
was “a stop-gap measure used to prevent homelessness,” not “a 
custodial sentence triggering criminal liability.”119 
The Tenth Circuit overruled the district court and upheld the 
indictment. Similar to the Second and Eighth Circuits, the Foster 
court looked first to the text of the statute. The court reasoned 
that the plain text of the statute does not distinguish between de-
fendants in nonpunitive versus punitive forms of custody.120 The 
Foster court agreed with the Government’s interpretation that an 
individual is in custody if “another person has the legal right to 
control his actions or limit his freedom.”121 Because the relevant 
question under this analysis is whether the individual defendant 
is under “control sufficient to constitute custody,”122 this rule is 
functionally similar to the restraints-on-activities approach. Un-
der both rules, the existence of restrictions upon the defendant 
establishes § 751(a) custody. 
The Tenth Circuit also adheres to an interpretation that cus-
tody “may be minimal or even constructive.”123 This rule was first 
articulated in United States v Depew,124 a Tenth Circuit case dealing 
 
 114 754 F3d 1186 (10th Cir 2014). 
 115 Id at 1189–91.114 
 116 Id at 1187. 
 117 Id. 
 118 Foster, 754 F3d at 1188. 
 119 Id. 
 120 Id at 1189. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Foster, 754 F3d at 1192–93. 
 123 Id at 1190. 
 124 977 F2d 1412 (10th Cir 1992). 
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with the issue of whether a defendant was in federal or state custody 
during a transfer on a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.125 
The handcuffed defendant attempted to escape from the supervi-
sion of a county sheriff while being driven between facilities.126 
The court suggested that the defendant’s status as “a federal pris-
oner who was due to be returned to serve time in a federal peni-
tentiary,” as well as his being “in the direct physical presence [of] 
and contact with a federal law enforcement officer,” indicated that 
he was in federal § 751(a) custody.127 
Although Depew is cited for the proposition that custody may 
be minimal or constructive,128 these specific facts suggest that 
custody is still linked to physical restraint or the prospect of con-
finement. Further, the cases that the Depew court offered as ex-
amples of the “wide range of circumstances” in which § 751(a) ap-
plies outside of the narrower context of prison escapes involved 
direct physical restraints and institutional confinement.129 The 
Foster court, however, denied that either was essential to the 
court’s conclusion, as “real physical confinement” is not a prereq-
uisite for custody.130 The Foster court instead characterized De-
pew’s holding more broadly, reading the case as suggesting that a 
defendant is in custody when “the restrictions of life . . . are suffi-
ciently limiting”—as when a defendant is required to live in a 
halfway house.131 
The Tenth Circuit has also invoked Depew in circumstances 
bearing even more attenuated relationships to traditional incar-
ceration. In United States v Ko,132 the Tenth Circuit sustained an 
escape indictment for a defendant subject to electronic monitor-
ing.133 Michael Ko was permitted to leave his home for work, but 
he was required to return every evening. When he did not return 
 
 125 Id at 1413–14. Habeas corpus ad prosequendum is a writ issued to remove a pris-
oner from one jurisdiction to another to face prosecution. See United States v Londono, 285 
F3d 348, 356 (5th Cir 2002) (per curiam). 
 126 Depew, 977 F2d at 1413. 
 127 Id at 1414. 
 128 See, for example, Foster, 754 F3d at 1189–90. 
 129 Depew, 927 F2d at 1414. The Depew court noted that the federal escape statute 
had been applied to offenders “serving [ ] state prison sentence[s] at [ ] federal correctional 
institution[s],” offenders “serv[ing] [ ] federal prison sentence[s] in [ ] state peniten-
tiar[ies],” and offenders in transit between federal and state or local facilities. Id. 
 130 Foster, 754 F3d at 1190. 
 131 Id, quoting United States v Sack, 379 F3d 1177, 1179 n 1 (10th Cir 2004). 
 132 739 F3d 558 (10th Cir 2014). 
 133 Id at 562. 
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one evening, he was charged with escape.134 The Tenth Circuit re-
jected Ko’s argument that the plain meaning of custody required 
physical confinement and could not encompass “leaving one’s own 
home.”135 The Tenth Circuit cited Depew for the proposition that 
the defendant’s “constant monitoring, [ ] monitoring bracelet, and 
spatial and temporal bounds” established custody.136 Although Ko 
involved a defendant who was transferred to home confinement 
to finish out a direct prison sentence, the Tenth Circuit has thus 
far given no indication that the special nature of supervised release 
would prevent a similar prosecution.137 
3. The Ninth Circuit: Custody is established by conditions 
equivalent to custodial incarceration. 
In United States v Burke,138 the Ninth Circuit adopted a very 
different test from the other circuits. Similar to Foster, Burke in-
volved a defendant who was “essentially homeless” and was sen-
tenced to a halfway house stay as a condition of supervised re-
lease.139 Anthony Burke checked out of the center and did not 
return.140 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal 
of an ensuing escape indictment, holding that Burke was not in 
custody under § 751(a), as he was not confined “under conditions 
equivalent to custodial incarceration.”141 
Burke is amenable to two interpretations. The first reading 
suggests that the court created a rule necessitating case-by-case 
analysis of whether a defendant on supervised release is subject 
 
 134 Id at 559–60. 
 135 Id at 560. 
 136 Ko, 739 F3d at 561–62. 
 137 The Tenth Circuit has suggested in dicta that a release condition requiring a de-
fendant to reside with a family member may create § 751(a) custody. See Sack, 379 F3d at 
1180 n 2: 
A defendant leaving the custody of the third party custodian . . . can menace the 
welfare of that custodian as easily as a defendant escaping from jail can menace 
corrections officers. The character of escape as “absenting oneself from custody 
without permission” is not altered by pre-existing relationships between the cus-
todian and the detainee. 
But see United States v Miranda, 749 F Supp 1062, 1064 (D Colo 1990) (“[A] bond condition 
that defendant live in a particular place is not tantamount to ‘custody.’ If the defendant 
had been required to live with his parents as a condition of bond, he would not have been 
charged with escape from custody if he decided to leave his parent[s’] residence.”). 
 138 694 F3d 1062 (9th Cir 2012). 
 139 Id at 1063. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id at 1064–65. 
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to conditions equivalent to custodial incarceration.142 The Burke 
court did not define custodial incarceration, but instead appeared 
to enforce the rule by evaluating the extent of the defendant’s re-
straints and comparing them to imprisonment. Under this inter-
pretation, Burke could not be charged with escape because the 
specific conditions of his supervised release term were too lenient 
to constitute custody. The Burke court observed that residents at 
the halfway house were “free to be employed outside the center, 
and to come and go during the day with permission if they logged 
in and out.”143 The Second Circuit relied on very similar facts in 
Edelman to assert that the limits placed on the defendant’s free-
dom indicated custody.144 The Ninth Circuit instead emphasized 
the extent of the liberty enjoyed by the defendant while on release.145 
It is unclear at what point release conditions become custo-
dial under this rule. The Government argued in Burke that the 
halfway house placed numerous restrictions on the defendant, 
such as “a curfew, limited visitors, assigned beds, restricted tele-
phone use,” and requiring residents to notify staff before leav-
ing.146 The halfway house also put residents on an “escape or ab-
scond status” if they failed to return to the center in a timely 
manner; the employees put Burke on escape status after he was 
still absent two hours after his estimated time of return.147 In dis-
missing the indictment, the district court remarked that the half-
way house rules were “standard” and reflected a “general under-
standing” that halfway houses are more lenient than custodial 
facilities.148 The Ninth Circuit’s application of the law to the facts 
of this case suggests that the equivalent-to-custodial-incarceration 
test may form a bright-line rule rather than a functional rule—
nothing less than prison conditions may constitute custody. 
As such, a second plausible reading of the opinion is that 
while Burke articulates an equivalent-to-custodial-incarceration 
 
 142 Burke, 694 F3d at 1064–65. See Foster, 754 F3d at 1191 (“In Burke, the Ninth 
Circuit focused only on whether Burke’s freedom was sufficiently restricted to constitute 
custody, looking to the fact that the conditions of his release were much more analogous 
to probation than they were to imprisonment.”) (quotation marks omitted). 
 143 Burke, 694 F3d at 1064. 
 144 See Edelman, 726 F3d at 307 (noting that residents at the halfway house “could 
not leave without notifying staff” and “could only leave the building for up to 12 hours at 
a time”). 
 145 See Burke, 694 F3d at 1064. 
 146 Id. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. 
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test, Burke functionally creates a per se rule. Few forms of super-
vised release resemble traditional incarceration as closely as half-
way house stays do,149 yet Burke suggests that halfway house 
terms are outside the reach of § 751(a). Further, several elements 
of the Burke court’s reasoning speak to the structure of supervised 
release more generally rather than to the specifics of the defend-
ant’s release term. The Ninth Circuit observed that the conditions 
of Burke’s release “were much more analogous to probation than 
they were to imprisonment.”150 Importantly, the court highlighted 
the fact that condition violations may be sanctioned through rev-
ocation (as with probation) rather than an independent criminal 
charge of escape.151 The Burke court also found it relevant that 
Burke, like all releasees, had completed a preceding prison term 
and was thus no longer in the custody of the Bureau of Prisons; 
the court distinguished past precedents on this basis.152 
The Burke court did not go so far as to formally create a per 
se rule. It was not necessary for the Ninth Circuit to determine 
the custodial status of other forms of supervised release in order 
to decide Burke. Additionally, it is difficult to reconcile sections of 
the opinion contrasting the specific conditions of the defendant’s 
confinement with direct imprisonment with a per se rule holding 
that supervised release is never custodial. The Burke court high-
lighted the similarities between supervised release and proba-
tion, but the opinion also appears to leave open the possibility 
that a defendant subject to a more-confining release condition (for 
example, a nonstandard halfway house) may be in § 751(a) custody. 
At the same time, Burke nevertheless plants the seeds for a 
per se rule by establishing a high bar for custody at the outset. By 
taking a highly confining type of supervision relative to other 
forms of supervised release and declaring it to be insufficiently 
confining to generate § 751(a) custody, the Burke rule suggests 
that few, if any, release conditions are custodial. 
 
 149 See Part I.C. 
 150 Burke, 694 F3d at 1064, quoting United States v Baxley, 982 F2d 1265, 1269 (9th 
Cir 1992). 
 151 See Burke, 694 F3d at 1065 (“Like an individual on probation, Burke was condi-
tionally released from incarceration; his failure to return to [the halfway house] was a 
violation of his release conditions punishable by revocation of release, not an escape from 
‘custody’ within the meaning of § 751(a).”); Baxley, 982 F2d at 1269–70 (stating that a 
probationer becomes an escapee only when, after having his probation revoked, “he there-
after fails to report for custodial incarceration”). 
 152 See Burke, 694 F3d at 1065. 
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B. Critiquing the Circuits’ Approaches 
There are three weaknesses in the circuits’ approaches that 
merit special attention. First, the reach of these holdings is un-
clear. Among the Second, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits, no circuit 
found the presence of physical or institutional confinement—in 
these cases, halfway houses—particularly relevant in determin-
ing whether the defendant was in custody. The Tenth Circuit di-
rectly denied the relevance of confinement, stating that “real 
physical confinement” is not a requirement for escape.153 Instead, 
the circuits created rules focusing on the presence of legal rights 
to control behavior or restraints on the defendant’s activities. 
These abstract rules suggest that many of the forms of supervised 
release detailed in Part I.C may be considered custodial under 
§ 751(a), in the absence of some limitation. 
Although the boundaries of these rules are unclear, there 
may be an implicit limiting factor within the escape statute itself. 
The statute requires prosecutors to prove that the defendant has 
“escape[d] or attempt[ed] to escape” as an element of the crime.154 
Not all condition violations may be characterized as escapes. A 
defendant who is banned from driving as a condition of supervised 
release may be in custody under the restraints-on-activities rule, 
but if she violated the terms of her release by driving, it would be 
difficult to construe that violation as an escape. This limiting 
principle becomes more complicated when the release conditions 
involve location-based restrictions on movement and association. 
As mentioned above, the Tenth Circuit suggested in Ko that fail-
ing to return to one’s home at a specific time may still constitute 
an escape from federal custody. The escape element has thus far 
failed to provide a meaningful restriction on § 751(a) liability. 
This lack of clear boundaries is problematic for three reasons. 
First, it makes it difficult to predict the consequences for violating 
release conditions. Second, it drastically expands the scope of 
criminal conduct by adding an overlapping criminal offense to a 
broad spectrum of release violations, even when those release con-
ditions could not independently give rise to criminal liability. 
Even more importantly, absent a meaningful limiting factor, the 
circuits’ rule verges on the absurd by encompassing a broad cate-
gory of individuals. Well-settled principles of statutory inter-
pretation generally counsel against such broad and unbounded 
 
 153 Foster, 754 F3d at 1190. 
 154 18 USC § 751(a). 
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readings of criminal statutes.155 The defendants in all four cases 
discussed above raised arguments that the rule of lenity obligated 
courts to resolve ambiguities over the construction of § 751(a) in 
their favor.156  
Third, the Second, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits’ opinions im-
port reasoning from parallel, but inapplicable, Supreme Court ju-
risprudence. Although the Supreme Court has not defined 
§ 751(a) custody, the Court has interpreted “custody” in the con-
text of 28 USC § 2241(c)(3) habeas proceedings. Section 2241(c)(3) 
grants federal courts jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from 
persons who are “in custody in violation of the Constitution or 
laws or treaties of the United States.”157 In Jones v Cunningham,158 
the Court addressed the question whether a state prisoner on pa-
role was still in custody within the meaning of the statute, such 
that a district court could entertain a claim that his state sentence 
was unconstitutional.159 
The Court unanimously concluded that the defendant was in 
custody.160 The Court defined custody as the condition resulting 
from the imposition of “significant[ ] restrain[ts]” on individual 
liberty,161 stretching beyond “actual, physical custody.”162 The 
Court further observed that the defendant was confined by parole 
order “to keep good company and good hours, work regularly, keep 
away from undesirable places, and live a clean, honest, and tem-
perate life,” and that even “a single deviation, however slight,” 
could result in a return to prison.163 It was not relevant to the 
Court’s analysis that the conditions were part of a rehabilitative 
process; it mattered only that the parole order prevented the pe-
titioner from participating in activities “which in this country free 
men are entitled to do.”164 
At first glance, Jones seems particularly instructive in that it 
involved a defendant on conditional release (parole) and issued an 
expansive reading of custody that could include forms of supervi-
sion falling short of direct imprisonment. Although the Second, 
 
 155 See Part III.A.3. 
 156 See Goad, 788 F3d at 876 n 3; Foster, 754 F3d at 1193–94; Edelman, 726 F3d at 
309–10; Burke, 694 F3d at 1065. 
 157 28 USC § 2241(c)(3). 
 158 371 US 236 (1963). 
 159 Id at 236. 
 160 Id at 243. 
 161 Id at 242–43. 
 162 Jones, 371 US at 239. 
 163 Id at 242. 
 164 Id at 242–43. 
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Eighth, and Tenth Circuits do not explicitly cite Jones, it seems 
far from coincidental that their respective opinions mirror the 
Jones Court’s analysis. Specifically, just as Jones suggests that 
custody is created by restraints, regardless of whether those re-
straints are rehabilitative, and that custody does not require di-
rect physical confinement for purposes of § 2241(c)(3), each circuit 
endorsed a similarly expansive reading of custody for purposes of 
§ 751(a). 
It is not clear that § 2241(c)(3) custody and § 751(a) custody 
must share the same meaning as a matter of statutory interpre-
tation. The same word may have different meanings in different 
statutes.165 Words often derive precise meaning from their statu-
tory context. In Wachovia Bank, National Association v 
Schmidt,166 for example, the Supreme Court declined to give the 
word “located” the same meaning in statutes pertaining to venue 
and to subject matter jurisdiction for national banks.167 Although 
lower courts had interpreted “located” uniformly, the Court ar-
gued that this conflation overlooked the “discrete offices” of venue 
and jurisdiction.168 
Similarly, the arguments advanced by the Supreme Court to 
support an expansive reading of habeas custody do not apply with 
equal force to escape custody, given the differing aims of 
§ 2241(c)(3) and § 751(a). The Court has emphasized that habeas 
is not “a static, narrow, formalistic remedy,”169 but a flexible de-
vice capable of “cut[ting] through barriers of form and procedural 
mazes.”170 A liberal interpretation of the custody requirement al-
lows courts to hear a diverse range of claims and prevents states 
 
 165 See, for example, Yates v United States, 135 S Ct 1074, 1082 (2015) (“We have 
several times affirmed that identical language may convey varying content when used in 
different statutes, sometimes even in different provisions of the same statute.”); Robinson 
v Shell Oil Co, 519 US 337, 342–44 (1997) (noting that “employee” has different meanings 
in different sections of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). But see Yates, 135 S Ct at 
1096–97 (Kagan dissenting) (“[T]he normal rule of statutory construction assumes that 
identical words used in different parts of the same act, passed at the same time, are in-
tended to have the same meaning. And that is especially true when the different provisions 
pertain to the same subject.”) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 166 546 US 303 (2006). 
 167 Id at 315–17. 
 168 Id at 319. See also Walter Wheeler Cook, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Con-
flict of Laws, 42 Yale L J 333, 337 (1933) (“The tendency to assume that a word which 
appears in two or more legal rules . . . has and should have precisely the same scope in all 
of them, runs all through legal discussions. It has all the tenacity of original sin and must 
constantly be guarded against.”). 
 169 Jones, 371 US at 243. 
 170 Harris v Nelson, 394 US 286, 291 (1969). 
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from evading the writ by declaring serious punishments noncus-
todial. In line with these aims, courts have read § 2241(c)(3) custody 
to include restrictions falling well short of confinement.171 
The concerns that motivated the Jones Court’s broad con-
struction of § 2241(c)(3) custody are inapplicable in the context of 
supervised release. While “custody” is used in § 2241(c)(3) to de-
fine courts’ habeas jurisdiction and, by extension, the availability 
of relief, “custody” is used in § 751(a) for a very different pur-
pose—to define the scope of criminal liability for escape. The fac-
tors advanced in Jones in support of a flexible and vague defini-
tion of custody are not convincing as applied to statutes that 
define crimes. In this context, concerns regarding fair notice, due 
process, and the constraint of enforcement discretion are para-
mount.172 It thus makes little sense to mechanically import 
§ 2241(c)(3) reasoning into the § 751(a) context. Using parallel 
rules may also lead to absurd results. For example, a defendant 
ordered to complete community service is in custody for habeas 
purposes.173 While a defendant who leaves a community service 
site is certainly disobedient, it seems incorrect to suggest that he 
has committed an escape, even though the legal rules defining 
§ 2241(c)(3) and § 751(a) custody are virtually identical in some 
circuits. 
Third, all four circuits rely on cases involving similar facts 
but different forms of conditional release that serve different pur-
poses within the criminal-justice system. The Second and Eighth 
Circuits cited United States v Rudinsky174 as persuasive author-
ity.175 In Rudinsky, the Sixth Circuit held that a defendant was in 
custody at a federal treatment center.176 The Tenth Circuit, as dis-
cussed above, cited Ko, a case involving a defendant subject to 
electronic monitoring.177 The defendants in both Rudinsky and Ko 
were completing direct prison sentences when they absconded. 
The defendant in Rudinsky was completing a criminal sentence 
for possessing stolen mail at a treatment center;178 the defendant 
 
 171 See, for example, Hensley v Municipal Court, San Jose-Milpitas Judicial District, 
Santa Clara County, 411 US 345, 345, 351 (1973) (holding that a person released “on his 
own recognizance” after conviction satisfies the habeas custody requirement). 
 172 See Part III.A.3. 
 173 See Barry v Bergen County Probation Department, 128 F3d 152, 161 (3d Cir 1997) 
(holding that community service satisfies the habeas custody requirement). 
 174 439 F2d 1074 (6th Cir 1971). 
 175 See Edelman, 726 F3d at 309; Goad, 788 F3d at 875. 
 176 Rudinsky, 439 F2d at 1076–77. 
 177 See Foster, 754 F3d at 1189–92. See also Part II.A.2. 
 178 Rudinsky, 439 F2d at 1075. 
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in Ko was transferred to home confinement by the Bureau of Prisons 
in order to complete the last four months of a prison sentence for 
conspiracy to distribute methamphetamines.179 None of these 
opinions explains why supervised release terms should be treated 
as equivalent to these forms of supervision, even though there are 
salient differences between the two. 
Further, all four circuits appear to read this legal question as 
revitalizing an earlier circuit split on whether halfway house 
stays as a condition of pretrial release could create § 751(a) cus-
tody. The three circuits holding that halfway house stays are custo-
dial in the supervised release context all cite United States v 
Sack,180 a Tenth Circuit decision holding that pretrial halfway 
house stays are custodial.181 Conversely, the Ninth Circuit in Burke 
relied in part on United States v Baxley,182 a case from that circuit 
holding that pretrial halfway house stays are noncustodial.183 
Only the Tenth Circuit offered an explanation for why Sack 
and Baxley might be persuasive. The Foster court suggested that 
pretrial detention is an appropriate analogue for supervised re-
lease, as it “also serves a non-punitive function and does not serve 
as a substitute for part of a prison sentence.”184 Still, the purposes 
of pretrial release differ substantially from the reasons for impos-
ing supervised release. Although pretrial release is nonpunitive, 
it is also nonrehabilitative.185 By conflating supervised release 
with other forms of criminal-justice supervision, the circuits fail 
to sufficiently account for how the targeted aims of the SRA may 
bear on whether supervised release conditions are custodial. 
* * * 
In summary, the circuits have created unbounded rules for 
defining § 751(a) custody. Interestingly, none of the four circuits 
chose to resolve this textual ambiguity by looking at the escape 
statute itself and asking whether supervised release violations 
fall within the conduct historically proscribed by the statute. In-
stead, the circuits covertly imported reasoning from the Supreme 
 
 179 Ko, 739 F3d at 559. 
 180 379 F3d 1177 (10th Cir 2004). 
 181 Id at 1182. See also Edelman, 726 F3d at 309; Goad, 788 F3d at 875–76; Foster, 
754 F3d at 1190. 
 182 982 F2d 1265 (9th Cir 1992). 
 183 Id at 1269–70; Burke, 694 F3d at 1064–65. 
 184 Foster, 754 F3d at 1191 n 3 (quotation marks and emphasis omitted). 
 185 See 18 USC § 3142(c)(1)(B) (directing courts to create pretrial release conditions 
to “assure the appearance” of the defendant at trial). 
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Court’s habeas jurisprudence and looked to precedents involving 
different forms of criminal-justice supervision—thus failing to 
take into account the importance of supervised release as a new 
form of criminal-justice supervision and a critical component of 
sentencing reform. Part III of this Comment clarifies this area of 
the law by filling the gaps the circuits have left and interpreting 
the applicability of escape to supervised release conditions in light 
of both the SRA and the history of § 751(a). 
III.  SUPERVISED RELEASE AND § 751(A) CUSTODY: THE 
CATEGORICAL RULE 
This Part argues in favor of a rule that supervised release 
conditions are categorically noncustodial under the escape stat-
ute. Although it may seem uncontroversial to prosecute individu-
als who abscond from facilities or violate court-ordered condi-
tions, both the SRA and the history of the escape statute strongly 
suggest that supervised release lies outside the ambit of § 751(a). 
In addition, the rule is normatively desirable, as it prevents con-
dition violations from unduly extending criminal sentences and 
trapping releasees in a cycle of punishment. The rule is also ad-
ministratively desirable, as it prevents the need for case-by-case 
inquiries into whether each defendant’s form of release is custo-
dial. Such inquiries are likely to lead to inconsistent application 
of the escape statute across jurisdictions. A categorical rule best 
gives effect to the SRA by emphasizing the barrier between re-
tributive concerns, which must be addressed during the selection 
of an appropriate prison sentence, and rehabilitative concerns, 
which are addressed during the selection of the term of supervised 
release. 
Part III.A traces the history of the federal escape statute. 
While there is no elegant definition of § 751(a) custody, several 
statutory developments suggest a narrow understanding of the 
term. Further, the statute has historically been used to rectify 
specific problems that do not implicate supervised release. 
Part III.B argues that escape prosecutions subvert the rehabilita-
tive and discretion-centralization purposes of the SRA by adding 
a new layer to the penalty structure that Congress created to re-
dress condition violations. If an individual violates a release con-
dition, that violation can be sufficiently redressed through these 
preexisting mechanisms; there is no need to add additional crim-
inal penalties in the absence of independently criminal conduct. 
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A. The Categorical Rule: The Federal Escape Statute 
While the circuits purport to derive their rules from the text 
of § 751(a), it is virtually impossible to resolve this split on a 
plain-meaning approach alone. Dictionary entries for “custody” 
contain both broad definitions that would insufficiently delineate 
the bounds of criminal conduct and narrow definitions that do not 
settle the question. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “custody” as 
“[t]he care and control of a thing or person for inspection, preser-
vation, or security,” or alternatively, “[t]he detention of a person 
by virtue of lawful process or authority.”186 The first definition 
contains six subentries with qualified versions of the term (“penal 
custody,” “protective custody,” etc.).187 Webster’s Third similarly 
defines “custody” as “the act or duty of guarding and preserving,” 
or alternatively, “imprisonment or durance of persons or charge 
of things.”188 Neither source obviously compels any one of the cir-
cuits’ rules. 
Courts must look beyond plain language when meaning is 
ambiguous or a literal interpretation would lead to an absurd re-
sult.189 Looking to the history and purposes of § 751(a) counsels 
against an expansive construction. 
1. The legislative and enforcement histories of § 751(a) 
suggest a narrow construction of “custody.” 
The Second, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits quote the statutory 
language directly, emphasizing that § 751(a) criminalizes escape 
from “any custody under or by virtue of any process.”190 While the 
text suggests an expansive reading of “custody” at first glance, 
looking to the history of the statute demonstrates the extent to 
which broad constructions of the clause are a relatively novel 
phenomenon. 
 
 186 Black’s Law Dictionary 467 (West 10th ed 2014) (“Black’s 2014”). The 1910 edition 
is the closest in time to the enactment of § 751(a). The entry for “custody” provides three 
definitions with increasing specificity: “care and keeping,” “detainer,” and “actual impris-
onment.” Black’s Law Dictionary 309 (West 2d ed 1910). The entry also notes that a sheriff 
who enforces a custodial sentence by instead “allowing the defendant to go at large under 
his general watch and control” may be held criminally liable for the defendant’s escape. Id. 
 187 Black’s 2014 at 467 (cited in note 186). 
 188 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged 
559 (Merriam 2002). 
 189 See Haggar Co v Helvering, 308 US 389, 394 (1940). 
 190 Goad, 788 F3d at 876, quoting 18 USC § 751(a). See also Foster, 754 F3d at 1189; 
Edelman, 726 F3d at 308. 
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Congress first codified the common-law crime of escape in 
1930.191 The statute was enacted as part of a program to improve 
the federal penal system.192 The original statute criminalized only 
(1) escapes from the custody of the attorney general or his au-
thorized representative and (2) escapes from penal or correctional 
institutions.193 Five years later, Congress amended § 751(a) at the 
attorney general’s request.194 Concerned that the existing statute 
did not capture escapes by prisoners held prior to conviction, the 
attorney general sent letters to the chairmen of the House and 
Senate Committees on the Judiciary.195 Each letter contained a 
draft proposal and a list of similar state statutes proscribing es-
capes by inmates held in jails (as opposed to penal institutions) 
while awaiting trial.196 
The ensuing amendment adopted the attorney general’s sug-
gestions almost verbatim, creating two new custodial categories 
in addition to the two existing categories. The newly created cat-
egory three relates to custody “by virtue of any process issued un-
der the laws of the United States by any court, judge, or commis-
sioner,” and category four accounts for “custody of [federal] 
officer[s] . . . pursuant to lawful arrest[s].”197 The facts that the 
language of the amendment mirrors that of the letter and that 
both of the relevant congressional reports insert the letter directly 
into the legislative history198 suggest that the addition of the 
seemingly most expansive category was intended to capture a dis-
crete group of individuals—federal prisoners awaiting trial. 
One might argue that the broad language of the amendment 
vitiates the significance of the attorney general’s intent. This ar-
gument would suggest that whatever his expressed intentions 
 
 191 Act of May 14, 1930 § 9, 46 Stat 325, 327, codified as amended at 18 USC § 751. 
 192 United States v Brown, 333 US 18, 21 (1948), citing generally HR Rep No 71-106, 
71st Cong, 2d Sess (1930). 
 193 Act of May 14, 1930 § 9, 46 Stat at 327, codified as amended at 18 USC § 751. 
 194 See Administration of Federal Prisons, S Rep No 74-1021, 74th Cong, 1st Sess 1 
(1935). See also Escape from Custody prior to Conviction, HR Rep No 74-803, 74th Cong, 
1st Sess 1 (1935) (“The purpose of H. R. 3430 is to make escape or attempted escape from 
custody under lawful arrest before conviction a criminal offense.”). 
 195 See Administration of Federal Prisons at 1 (cited in note 194); Escape from Custody 
prior to Conviction at 2 (cited in note 194). 
 196 See Administration of Federal Prisons at 2 (cited in note 194) (including, for exam-
ple, a Michigan statute providing that “any person lawfully imprisoned awaiting examina-
tion on trial, arraignment or sentence who shall escape shall be guilty of an offense”); 
Escape from Custody prior to Conviction at 1 (cited in note 194). 
 197 Act of Aug 3, 1935, 49 Stat 513, 513–14, codified as amended at 18 USC § 751. 
 198 See Administration of Federal Prisons at 1 (cited in note 194); Escape from Custody 
prior to Conviction at 2 (cited in note 194). 
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were, the language of the “by virtue of any process” clause (cate-
gory three) sweeps broadly enough to encompass court-ordered 
release conditions. As the circuits have argued in the halfway 
house cases, the clause seems to potentially encompass many 
forms of criminal-justice supervision. 
While the attorney general’s narrow objective is not disposi-
tive, the history behind the 1935 amendment sheds light on the 
meaning of “custody.” The breadth of the “by virtue” clause is still 
entirely a function of the breadth of “custody,” and if the term 
“custody” is read narrowly, the discontinuity between the attor-
ney general’s expressed aim (to expand § 751(a) to cover inmates 
who abscond from court-ordered confinement prior to trial) and 
the language of the “by virtue” clause disappears. Conversely, an 
expansive construction of category three renders category two 
(escapes from penal institutions) entirely superfluous. All escapes 
from penal institutions would be subsumed under a broad read-
ing of three, running afoul of the interpretative canon against 
surplusage.199 
Three developments further support a narrow construction. 
First, § 751(a) has never been used to prosecute violations of 
court-ordered parole conditions.200 Parole, which existed at the 
time of the amendment, may include location-based conditions 
and would plausibly fall within the language of the “by virtue” 
clause under a broad construction of custody. 
This lack of enforcement history may be motivated by more 
than prudential concerns—at least one court has suggested in 
dicta that parole violations simply do not fall under the statute, 
observing: “[I]t has never been held, and it is not now contended, 
that a parole violator has escaped from custody for purposes of an 
escape statute.”201 This absence of case law for parole violators is 
significant with respect to the circuit split at issue in the halfway 
house cases, as parole is the direct predecessor of supervised 
release.202 
 
 199 See Ratzlaf v United States, 510 US 135, 140–41 (1994) (“Judges should hesitate 
[ ] to treat statutory terms [as superfluous] in any setting, and resistance should be height-
ened when the words describe an element of a criminal offense.”). 
 200 I could not find any § 751(a) prosecutions for parole violators, even though federal 
parole existed when the act codifying escape was first passed and parole may include location-
based conditions. Existing cases deal only with parole violators who are first arrested or 
recommitted and then subsequently abscond. See, for example, United States v Franklin, 
313 F Supp 43, 44–47 (SD Ind 1970). 
 201 See United States v Person, 223 F Supp 982, 984 (SD Cal 1963). 
 202 See Part I.A. 
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Second, the circuits’ reliance on the statute’s reference to any 
custody as textual support is misguided. Although the language 
of category three was changed from custody “by virtue of any pro-
cess” to its present form, “any custody under or by virtue of any 
process,”203 this appears to have been a stylistic emendation ra-
ther than a substantive edit intended to signal an expansive un-
derstanding of the term. 
The 1948 act that amended the language was part of an ex-
tensive recodification of the criminal statutes intended to clean 
up language and eliminate redundancies in the criminal code 
while avoiding dramatic changes to the underlying substantive 
content.204 Courts have treated these edits carefully, noting that 
while the revisions do not require “slavish adherence to the pre-
decessor statutes,” courts “must not attribute to the 1948 [edits] 
any substantial disruption in prior congressional purpose or pol-
icy without first discerning clear evidence that such a departure 
was intended.”205 Indeed, the relevant legislative report disavows 
any major alteration to § 751, describing the revisions as changes 
in “phraseology and arrangement.”206 
Third, Congress’s handling of situations involving prisoners 
on furlough and work release also demonstrates a limited under-
standing of custody for the purposes of escape.207 If a prisoner is 
released to attend a funeral, but fails to return to prison for rein-
carceration, may he be prosecuted under the federal escape stat-
ute? If custody depends on either a restraints-on-activities or a 
right-to-control rule, failing to return may be prosecuted under 
§ 751(a). 
Yet in 1965, Congress passed a separate act to criminalize 
“[t]he willful failure of a prisoner to remain within the extended 
limits of his confinement, or to return within the time prescribed 
to an institution or facility designated by the Attorney General,” 
noting that such acts should be “deemed an escape.”208 The statute 
 
 203 Act of June 25, 1948 § 751, 62 Stat 683, 734–35, codified as amended at 18 USC § 751. 
 204 See Report from the Committee on the Judiciary, HR Rep No 80-304, 80th Cong, 
1st Sess 2–9 (1947) (describing the mechanisms and goals of the 1948 revisions). 
 205 CNA Financial Corp v Donovan, 830 F2d 1132, 1146 (DC Cir 1987). 
 206 Report from the Committee on the Judiciary at A67 (cited in note 204). 
 207 Furloughs are permitted under 18 USC § 3622 (authorizing the Bureau of Prisons 
to release prisoners for limited periods of time in order to visit dying relatives and obtain 
medical treatment, among other reasons). 
 208 Act of Sept 10, 1965, Pub L No 89-176, 79 Stat 674, 675, codified at 18 USC 
§ 4082(d). For a discussion of the two statutes, see United States v Leonard, 498 F2d 754, 
757 (DC Cir 1974) (suggesting that Congress enacted the Act of September 10, 1965, in 
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does not provide for any enhanced penalties that might distin-
guish it from an ordinary § 751(a) violation, noting only that a 
violation is “punishable as provided in” the escape section of the 
US Code.209 The fact that Congress enacted a separate statute to 
constructively deem such acts escapes may reflect a legislative 
endorsement of the view that § 751(a) custody is ordinarily linked 
to confinement and restraint, rather than an abstract legal right 
to enforce compliance. In line with this understanding, the failure-
to-return statute explicitly applies to prisoners—excluding parol-
ees and probationers from comparable liability. 
2. The purposes of § 751(a) are not served by prosecutions 
for supervised release violations. 
The above analysis demonstrates why the circuits’ broad con-
structions of § 751(a) custody are inconsistent with a historical 
understanding of the statute, but it does not fully explain why 
release violations should be excluded from the statute. Given that 
§ 751(a) predates the creation of supervised release by fifty-four 
years, it is important to examine the purposes underlying 
§ 751(a) in assessing its applicability to release. Moreover, while 
the Supreme Court has not offered an interpretation of “custody” 
for purposes of § 751(a), the Court has defined the term in several 
other contexts with special reference to the broader purposes of 
the relevant provision, eschewing formal definitions for func-
tional rules.210 
In an early case, the Supreme Court observed that the escape 
statute is intended to reduce special risks posed to the public by 
a “violent” and “menacing” escape.211 The Court adopted the Gov-
ernment’s reasoning that escapes and attempted escapes present 
problems of “penal discipline,” as they endanger “the lives of 
guards and custodians,” and “carry in their wake other crimes at-
tendant upon procuring money, weapons and transportation and 
 
order to criminalize prisoners’ failure to return from furloughs in response to a district 
court opinion declaring such acts to be outside the scope of § 751(a)). 
 209 18 USC § 4082(a). 
 210 See Jones, 371 US at 241–43 (discussing the need to define § 2241 habeas custody 
broadly to protect individuals from wrongful restraint); Howes v Fields, 132 S Ct 1181, 
1189 (2012) (defining custody for Miranda purposes as “a term of art [ ] specif[ying] cir-
cumstances that are thought generally to present a serious danger of coercion,” focusing 
on “all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation”). 
 211 Brown, 333 US at 21 n 5. 
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upon resisting recapture.”212 Under this interpretation, an es-
caped prisoner commits an independent wrong by creating a dan-
gerous environment. This wrong is punishable as an independent 
criminal offense. This reading of § 751(a) has had lasting legal 
effect. More recently, the Supreme Court has used this same logic 
to hold that escape “is a continuing offense . . . [g]iven the contin-
uing threat to society posed by an escaped prisoner.”213 
While these concerns are certainly relevant in the context of 
supervised release, the harms prevented are occasionally more 
speculative. The “menaces” posed by a defendant who walks away 
from a halfway house, fails to report for a meeting, or violates a 
curfew are not equivalent to those posed by an escaped prisoner 
who immediately becomes a fugitive and must act quickly to 
evade detection. United States v Brown214 points to proximate 
custodians endangered by a prison break, but defendants on re-
lease do not have similarly close guards.215 Release violators cer-
tainly have strong incentives to avoid detection and further pen-
alties. But because they are not under direct surveillance, this 
evasion may not require the dangerous dash to obtain “money, 
weapons and transportation” that Brown envisions.216 
But more importantly, unlike a prisoner or an arrestee, a de-
fendant on release is essentially at liberty, having completed a 
preceding prison term. Sentencing judges may choose only be-
tween releasing the defendant to full liberty or adding a release 
term and requiring the defendant to adhere to a set of conditions. 
In short, the public already assumes a baseline degree of recidi-
vism risk when an individual is released from prison. It is not 
clear that there is any increase in risk created by requiring that 
individual to undergo additional monitoring, let alone an increase 
sufficient to justify an independent offense for escape—particu-
larly when there are preexisting mechanisms for redressing re-
lease violations.217 
One counterargument is that Congress, in authorizing judges 
to consider incapacitation when imposing supervised release, 
 
 212 Id. 
 213 United States v Bailey, 444 US 394, 413 (1980). 
 214 333 US 18 (1948). 
 215 Releasees are supervised by probation officers. Many judges impose standard con-
ditions requiring defendants to report to their officer on a regular basis, allow visits by 
their officer, and notify their officer if they are arrested or questioned by law enforcement 
officers. See USSG § 5D1.3(c)(2), (10)–(11). 
 216 Brown, 333 US at 21 n 5. 
 217 See Part I.B. 
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acknowledged potential risks posed by releasees.218 This argu-
ment is not persuasive. Sentencing judges have a corresponding 
statutory duty to impose “no greater deprivation of liberty than is 
reasonably necessary.”219 Release conditions are ordinarily quasi-
incapacitative at best;220 detentive conditions such as halfway 
house stays still permit defendants to seek employment and leave 
with permission. Because the central aim of supervised release is 
to ease the defendant’s transition to community life, courts may 
not protect the public by replicating incarceration. 
The transitional nature of supervised release is thus funda-
mentally at odds with the rationale underlying escape prosecu-
tions. Simply put, supervised release requires judges to integrate 
formerly incarcerated persons into the wider community; escape 
is designed to punish offenders for the risks that they present to 
the public when they abscond from seclusion or resist lawful 
proceedings. 
3. The rule of lenity favors a narrow construction of 
§ 751(a). 
The rule of lenity suggests that textual ambiguities in crimi-
nal statutes should be construed narrowly.221 Lenity is rarely ap-
plied, as it is operative only in “situations in which a reasonable 
doubt persists about a statute’s intended scope even after resort 
to the language and structure, legislative history, and motivating 
policies of [a] statute.”222 In theory, the rule operates as a back-
ground default to advance fair notice and cabin enforcement dis-
cretion.223 Another rationale is that the rule implements the sep-
aration of powers, “strik[ing] the appropriate balance between the 
legislature, the prosecutor, and the court in defining criminal lia-
bility.”224 Under this view, lenity safeguards against interpreta-
tive slippage by requiring explicit legislative authorization for the 
expansion of criminal statutes. One commentator has gone further, 
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suggesting that the rule of lenity is designed to “provoke legisla-
tive correction” by having judges construe statutes in favor of tra-
ditionally disfavored interest groups, causing favored groups to 
override the decision but clarify latent ambiguities in the process.225 
The interpretative-slippage justification has special relevance 
in this area, in which changed circumstances may drastically ex-
pand an ambiguous criminal statute to a broad class of ex-offenders 
without a clear legislative mandate. These slippage concerns are 
more than hypothetical. Prosecutors must enforce rules even in 
the absence of such a legislative mandate or other similarly final 
resolution. Thus, expansive court constructions have a direct in-
fluence on prosecutorial policy. For example, in the escape con-
text, the entry for § 751(a) in the U.S. Attorneys’ Manual cur-
rently provides that custody “need only be minimal.”226 The 
manual cites Eighth Circuit precedent in support of this rule,227 
even though there is disagreement among the circuits over how 
broadly to construe § 751(a) custody. Although there are other 
strong statutory construction arguments in favor of an unequivo-
cal finding that supervised release conditions are categorically 
noncustodial, in the alternative, courts may arrive at the same 
outcome through the application of lenity. 
B. The Categorical Rule: The Sentencing Reform Act 
There are also several policy justifications for a categorical 
rule. Importantly, these justifications are not freestanding con-
siderations, but are embodied within the SRA. While the circuits 
that have considered this issue have looked exclusively to § 751(a) 
in determining whether supervised release conditions are custo-
dial, the SRA is a similarly relevant statute. As discussed in Parts 
I.A–B, the SRA created supervised release in order to facilitate 
offender rehabilitation and centralize sentencing discretion. Both 
of these purposes are inextricably linked with the specific penalty 
structure that Congress created to redress violations, a structure 
that is compromised by parallel prosecutions for escape. 
One of the principal innovations of the SRA was to separate 
the punitive and rehabilitative aspects of a prison sentence. To 
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 2294  The University of Chicago Law Review [83:2257 
   
enforce this divide, Congress has historically exerted careful con-
trol over the penalties that defendants may face for condition vi-
olations.228 The SRA originally did not contain revocation proceed-
ings; Congress instead envisioned that contempt could redress 
serious violations.229 For less serious violations, releasees’ reha-
bilitation was best served by intermediate sanctions, rather than 
returning them to prison.230 
Even revocation places meaningful limitations on reincarcer-
ation.231 First, revocation is not automatic. Sentencing judges 
have discretion in determining when to revoke, if at all.232 Second, 
even when judges opt for prison time, they need not require in-
carceration for the entire length of the term. Congress made 
clear that the postrevocation sentence itself may include super-
vised release.233 This feature was added to allow judges to care-
fully craft their responses to condition violations, rather than 
forcing judges to reimprison releasees for longer than neces-
sary.234 In short, revocation is structured to allow judges to ensure 
that a defendant remains at liberty whenever appropriate. 
Because sentencing judges may carefully calibrate their re-
sponse to a violation, supervised release’s structure tolerates a 
degree of noncompliance as necessary for rehabilitation. Rather 
than requiring automatic sanctions for disfavored behaviors, the 
system allows releasees to make some errors before facing revo-
cation. In line with this toleration, the Seventh Circuit in United 
States v Smith235 criticized a sentencing judge for precommitting 
herself to a specific sanction for a violation,236 thus “conflat[ing] 
criminality with disobedience.”237 Framing condition violations as 
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independent crimes prevents rehabilitation by adding a new pu-
nitive layer to this system. Escape prosecutions blend disobedi-
ence and criminality by punishing releasees in instances in which 
a sentencing judge might choose a lesser sanction, or might even 
decline to sanction at all.238 The results are conceptually odd. Un-
der the dominant approach among the circuits, a sentencing 
judge’s decision to excuse or to not excuse a condition violation 
has no bearing on whether the defendant may face criminal lia-
bility for that same action. 
Escape prosecutions also thwart rehabilitation by drastically 
multiplying the consequences that a defendant faces for a location-
based condition violation. For example, imagine that a defendant 
commits a crime and is ordered to serve the maximum  term of 
supervised release authorized by statute for his offense (R1) after 
serving his prison term (P1). The defendant is ordered to reside at 
a halfway house, but he leaves the facility and fails to return. The 
defendant may face up to five years in prison if convicted of escape 
(P2).239 Further, because escape is a class D felony, the sentencing 
judge is authorized to impose up to three years of supervised re-
lease (R2).240 
One of the mandatory conditions of all release terms is that 
the releasee avoids committing a “Federal, State, or local crime” 
while under supervision.241 Thus, the defendant is now eligible for 
revocation of R1. The Sentencing Commission would classify an 
escape conviction as a Grade B violation.242 The Commission rec-
ommends that sentencing judges revoke release for a violation of 
this grade.243 If the judge revokes R1, the offender will be sen-
tenced to a new prison term (P3) for up to the maximum term 
length that the judge could have imposed for the defendant’s first 
term of supervised release (R1), with no reduction for previous 
time spent on release.244 
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To further complicate matters, the postrevocation sentence 
P3 may itself include a supervised release term (R3), so long as the 
total revocation term (consisting of both imprisonment and the 
new release term) does not exceed the maximum term of super-
vised release authorized for the original offense (P3 + R3 ≤ R1).245 
In total, a defendant who escapes in the second year of a three-
year term of supervised release (R1 = 3) faces up to three years in 
prison as a revocation penalty (P3), minus any extra release (R3); 
up to five years in prison for escape (P2); and up to three years of 
a new supervised release term (R2). A single release violation may 
transform R1 into at most two release terms and two prison sen-
tences.246 Even though the hypothetical defendant has already 
completed two years of his supervised release term, he may face a 
maximum of eight years of prison and a maximum of three years 
of supervised release. 
This dual sentencing process also frustrates the discretion-
centralization purposes of the SRA. A key innovation of the SRA 
was to consolidate sentencing authority in district court judges, 
rather than partitioning responsibility between judges and the 
United States Parole Commission.247 Escape prosecutions thwart 
this reform by multiplying the number of individuals with discre-
tionary control over the defendant’s sentence from the moment 
that the prosecutor decides to bring an independent criminal 
charge of § 751 escape. 
A lack of centralized control may have the effect of replicating 
some of the perverse incentives that Congress expressly sought to 
avoid by consolidating authority in district court judges. For ex-
ample, both Burke and Foster involved district court judges who 
added halfway house conditions to give homeless releasees a place 
to stay at the end of their sentences.248 Tying escape liability to 
violations may dissuade judges from acting similarly in the fu-
ture, given that they do not have complete control over the conse-
quences if the releasee absconds and is subsequently indicted for 
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escape. The same applies for judges who use supervised release 
as a vehicle for granting releasees access to mental health ser-
vices or treatment programs. 
These consequences suggest that courts should avoid con-
struing release conditions as custodial conditions giving rise to 
§ 751(a) escape liability. A categorical rule excluding supervised 
release conditions from § 751(a) custody best gives effect to the 
SRA by leaving the existing statutory penalty structure in place. 
CONCLUSION 
Commentators have criticized supervised release for failing 
to live up to its initial promise and perpetuating incarceration in 
instances in which “the utility of [ ] continued imprisonment is 
difficult to see.”249 Escape prosecutions exacerbate this effect by 
doubling the penalties that ex-offenders face for violating the 
terms of their release, trapping individuals who are not truly 
reoffending in a cycle of imprisonment. 
States with similar supervision programs have confronted 
similar issues.250 These issues will continue to arise over the com-
ing years as federal parole is phased out and the proportion of ex-
offenders serving release terms increases.251 Although shielding 
supervised release violators from escape prosecutions may seem 
like a drastic step at first blush, the categorical rule is most con-
sistent with the evolution of the federal crime of escape and best 
gives effect to the transitional and discretion-centralization aims 
of the SRA. The rule does not mean that disobedient releasees will 
get off scot-free—it merely requires courts to use appropriate 
preexisting mechanisms for sanctioning condition violations. 
Most importantly, the categorical rule will help clarify the divide 
between rehabilitation and punishment by carefully defining the 
consequences that may result from a condition violation. 
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